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Eco-Firms and Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation 
Sang-Ho Lee* and Chul-Hi Park** 
This article investigates the strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) 
of polluting firms in the presence of eco-firms. When the firms decide ECSR sequentially 
within the framework of the managerial incentive design and then face simultaneous price 
competition, we show that firms will adopt ECSR and purchase abatement goods to mitigate 
competition if the products are more substitutable, but the late adopter chooses lower ECSR 
and thus earns higher profit. It can partially explain the current expansive adoption of ECSR 
as an industry-wide wave. 
JEL classification code : L1, L2, M2 
Keywords: environmental corporate social responsibility; eco-firms; abatement goods; late 
adopter advantage 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays increasing attention has been paid to environmental corporate social responsibility 
(ECSR) in both practice and academia. A large number of polluting companies recently 
participate in greenhouse gas reduction programs and issue various ECSR statements and 
activities in their annual reports.1 The ECSR wave, the trend of sequential expansion of 
ECSR, is now more popular and getting expanding.2 Then, why do firms actively and 
sequentially adopt ECSR even though the adoption of ECSR increases the company’s own 
cost and thus causes a cost disadvantage? 
Since Porter and van der Linde (1995) ignited the environment-competitiveness relationship 
to introduce the concept of creating shared value of ECSR, a growing interest in strategic 
                                          
* Professor, Department of Economics, Chonnam National University, sangho@jnu.ac.kr 
** Corresponding author, Research fellow, Center for Regional Development, Chonnam National University, 
newhuman@hanmail.net 
1 Lyon and Maxwell (2004) and Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) provided fruitful discussions on the 
practical and academic issues on ECSR. 
2 CSR trend report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010/2011) suggested that the number of companies with CSR 
statements on their websites increased to 81% at the end of July 2010 from 75% at the end of July 2009. KPMG 
(2008/2013), nearly 80% of the 250 largest companies worldwide issued CSR reports in 2008 and more than 
30% (71%, 90%) companies of US (UK, Japan, respectively) adopted CSR in 2013. For more descriptions, see 
Bian, et al. (2016) and Hirose, et al. (2017). 
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ECSR has been characterizing the recent business and economics literature. Recently, from 
the viewpoint of instrumental ECSR, Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015), and 
Hirose et al. (2016, 2017) explained how ECSR is desirable for both polluting firms and the 
society when firms adopt ECSR strategically. In particular, Hirose et al. (2017) employed the 
strategic managerial incentive design, in which the separation of ownership and management 
exists and shareholders can induce managers to operate their firm based on certain 
managerial incentives, and showed that the ECSR can enhance the profitability of polluting 
firms.3 However, they examined a simultaneous choice on ECSR and thus provided limited 
explanations about the recent ECSR wave. 
On the other hand, the current global concerns on climate change and the subsequent tighter 
environmental policies have induced the emergence of eco-firms, which produce pollution 
abatement goods in the eco-industry.4 Previous literature on the eco-industry is focused on 
the relationship with mandatory policy instruments such as emission taxes and abatement 
subsidies rather than voluntary participation by the firms.5 Therefore, this compliance 
approach is not much useful to explain how the eco-firms contribute to the recent voluntary 
adoption of ECSR. 
In this article, we incorporate eco-firms and polluting firms in order to formulate the model of 
managerial incentive design in a duopolistic market and investigate the strategic interaction in 
the sequential adoption of ECSR. We show that both firms will adopt ECSR sequentially and 
purchase abatement goods from the eco-firms to increase their profits if the two products are 
more substitutable under price competition. This is because the choices of profitable ECSR 
are strategic complements, which induce to mitigate price competition and thus increase the 
equilibrium prices, which can serve to earn more profits. We also show that the late adopter 
sets lower ECSR than that of the early adopter and thus, earns a higher profit, i.e., late 
adopter advantage exists. It can partially explain the current expansive adoption of ECSR as 
an industry-wide wave. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: We construct a basic model in section 2 and 
provide an analysis in section 3. We conclude in the final section. 
                                          
3 Concerning CSR-related incentives, Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2015) and Bian, et al. (2016) 
also considered the managerial incentive design and showed that the emergence of a CSR firm can enhance its 
profitability, compared to pure profit-seeking firms. 
4 The importance of the eco-industry has been recognized by policy reports in international institutions. 
According to Environmental Business International (2012), the global market size of the eco-industry was 
approximately US$838 billion in 2010 and is expected to reach US$992 billion by 2017. 
5 See, for example, David and Sinclair-Desgagne (2005), Canton, et al. (2008) and Lee and Park (2011) in the 
literature of eco-industry. 
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2. The Model 
Consider a vertically related market where polluting duopoly firms sell consumption goods to 
consumers and an eco-firm sells abatement goods to polluting firms. Following Singh and 
Vives (1984), we assume the quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer 
given by 
ܷሺݍଵ, ݍଶሻ ൌ ܣሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ െ ଵଶ ሺݍଵଶ ൅ 2ߚݍଵݍଶ ൅ ݍଶଶሻ  ሺ1ሻ 
where ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ represents the degree of product differentiation: a small number indicates a 
larger degree of product differentiation. Then, the inverse demand function is linear given by 
௜ܲ ൌ ܣ െ ݍ௜ െ ߚݍ௝, ݅ ൌ 1,2		ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ	  ሺ2ሻ 
where ௜ܲ and ݍ௜ are firm ݅’s price and quantity, respectively.  
Both firms produce differentiated products but emit the same pollutants. They can also reduce 
the emission level by purchasing abatement goods, ܽ௜, produced by the eco-firm. We assume 
an end-of-pipe technology in which an emission function is linear, 
݁௜ሺݍ௜, ܽ௜ሻ ൌ ݍ௜ െ ܽ௜  ሺ3ሻ 
We also assume that damage function is quadratic: 
ܦ ൌ ݀ሺ෌ ݁௜ሺݍ௜, ܽ௜ሻଶ௜ୀଵ ሻଶ  ሺ4ሻ 
where d (> 0) is the coefficient of environmental damage function. 
We assume that two polluting firms are characterized by separate ownership and management. 
In a managerial delegation model,6 each firm consists of an owner who owns the firm and 
manager who makes decisions based on the incentive contract designed by the corresponding 
firm owner. In particular, each manager’s compensation structure is proportional to a linear 
combination of profit and the ECSR incentive. In particular, the pay-off function of the 
manager of the polluting firm is given by: 
௜ܶ ൌ ߨ௜ െ ߠ௜݀ሺݍ௜ െ ܽ௜ሻଶ  ሺ5ሻ 
                                          
6 See, for example, Fershtman (1985) and Sklivas (1987) in the literature of managerial delegation game. 
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where ߨ௜ is firm i’s profit and ߠ௜ (൒ 0) is the internal emission price on the damage it 
produced, which represents the degree of ECSR, determined by the owner of firm ݅. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that marginal production cost is zero. Then, the owner of firm ݅ 
maximizes its profit, which is given by 
ߨ௜ ൌ ௜ܲݍ௜ െ ݎܽ௜  ሺ6ሻ 
where ݎ is the unit price of abatement goods, determined by the eco-firm.  
Then, the eco-firm maximizes the following profit function: 
ߨ௎ ൌ ݎܽ௎  ሺ7ሻ 
where ܽ௎ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜ଶ௜ୀଵ . The production cost of abatement goods is also assumed at zero. 
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first and second stages, respectively, the owner of 
each polluting firm decides the degree of ECSR to maximize its own profit in (6) sequentially. 
The owner of firm 1 chooses its ECSR in the first stage and the owner of firm 2 follows in the 
second stage, without loss of generality. In the third stage, the eco-firm sets the price of 
abatement goods to maximize its own profit in (7). Finally, each polluting firm faces price 
competition and the manager of each firm decides the price of consumption goods and the 
amount of abatement goods to maximize its own objective function in (5). All games are 
solved by backward induction. 
3. The Analysis 
In the fourth stage, assuming interior solutions on prices, the first-order Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions of each polluting firm with respect to iP  and ia  are as follows: 
డ்೔
డ௉೔ ൌ ݍ௜ ൅ ௜ܲ
డ௤೔
డ௉೔ െ 2݀ߠ௜ሺݍ௜ െ ܽ௜ሻ
డ௤೔
డ௉೔ ൌ 0,    ሺ8ሻ 
డ்೔
డ௔೔ ൌ െr ൅ 2݀ߠ௜ሺݍ௜ െ ܽ௜ሻ ൑ 0,			ܽ௜ ൒ 0  and ܽ௜
డ்೔
డ௔೔ ൌ 0                       ሺ9ሻ 
There are four possible cases, depending on the choices of the two firms on the purchase of 
abatement goods. In particular, imposing interior solutions, i.e., ܽ௜ ൌ ݍ௜ െ ௥ଶௗఏ೔ ൐ 0 from (9), 
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yields the following equilibrium outcomes of fourth stage:7 
௜ܲ ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉሻା௥ଶିఉ    ሺ10ሻ 
ܽ௜ ൌ ଶௗఏ೔ሺ஺ି௥ሻି௥ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻଶௗሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻఏ೔  ሺ11ሻ 
ݍ௜ ൌ ஺ି௥ଶାఉିఉమ  ሺ12ሻ 
Q ൌ ଶሺ஺ି௥ሻଶାఉିఉమ   ሺ13ሻ 
Note that we have ܽ௜ ൐ 0 and ݍ௜ ൐ ௥ଶௗఏ೔ if ߠ௜ ൐
௥ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻ
ଶௗሺ஺ି௥ሻ ≡ ߠప෡ .  
Using ܽ௎ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜ଶ௜ୀଵ , the profit of firm ݅ in (6) and that of the eco-firm in (7) is as follows, 
respectively: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ௥
మሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻାଶௗሺ஺ି௥ሻమሺଵିఉሻఏ೔
ଶௗሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻఏ೔   ሺ14ሻ 
ߨ௎ ൌ ݎܽ௎ ൌ ௥ሺସௗሺ஺ି௥ሻఏభఏమି௥ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺఏభାఏమሻሻଶௗሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻఏభఏమ .  ሺ15ሻ 
In the third stage, the eco-firm decides the following optimal price of abatement goods, which 
maximizes its profit in (15): 
ݎ ൌ ଶ஺ௗఏభఏమሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺఏభାఏమሻାସௗఏభఏమ.  ሺ16ሻ 
Note that ݎ is always positive as long as ߠ௜ is positive. Note also that both polluting firms’ 
ECSR levels positively affect the price of abatement goods, డ௥డఏ೔ ൐ 0, which increases the 
equilibrium price of consumption goods in (10).  
The equilibrium price as follows: 
௜ܲ ൌ ஺ሺሺଶିఉሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺఏ೔ାఏೕሻାଶௗሺଷିଶఉሻఏ೔ఏೕሻሺଶିఉሻሺሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺఏ೔ାఏೕሻାସௗఏ೔ఏೕሻ 																																				  ሺ17ሻ 
where డ௉೔డఏ೔ ൐ 0. That is, the adoption of ECSR increases the equilibrium price of consumption 
goods. From (11), we also have: 
                                          
7 We can show that the analysis with interior solutions provides a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when 
ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ. See Proposition 1 and the proof in Appendix I. 
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ܽ௜ ൌ ஺ఏ೔ሺሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻାଶௗఏೕሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺఏ೔ାఏೕሻାସௗఏ೔ఏೕሻ                                      ሺ18ሻ 
Thus, ܽ௜ ൐ 0 as far as ߠ௜ ൐ 0.8  
The profit of polluting firm i in (14) can be rewritten as follows: 
ߨ௜ ൌ
஺మቆሺଵିఉሻሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻమఏೕమାሺଵିఉሻఏ೔మቀሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻାଶௗఏೕቁ
మାଶሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻఏ೔ఏೕቀሺଵିఉሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻାௗሺସିଷఉሻఏೕቁቇ
ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻቀሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻ൫ఏ೔ାఏೕ൯ାସௗఏ೔ఏೕቁ
మ 	  ሺ19ሻ 
In the second stage, the owner of firm 2, late adopter, decides the degree of ECSR that will 
maximize its profit by observing firm 1’s ECSR. The reaction function of firm 2 is as follows: 
ߠଶ ൌ ఉሺଵାఉሻሺଶିఉሻఏభሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺସିଷఉሻାସௗሺଷିଶఉሻఏభ  ሺ20ሻ 
Note that ߠଶ is positive as far as ߠଵ is positive. Thus, firm 2 is not willing to participate in 
ECSR as far as firm 1 does not adopt ECSR. Note also that the slope of the reaction function 
of firm 2 is positive but smaller than one, i.e., 0 ൏ డఏೕሺఏ೔ሻడఏ೔ ൏ 1. It implies that the choices 
regarding ECSR are strategic complements. Thus, when firm 1 increases its ECSR, firm 2 is 
also willing to increase its ECSR, which will increase the equilibrium prices. But, firm 2’s 
ECSR is lower than that of firm 1. 
In the first stage, the owner of firm 1, early adopter, considers the reaction function of firm 2 
in (19) in its profit function and decides its optimal degree of ECSR as follows: 
ߠଵ∗ ൌ ሺଶିఉሻ
మሺଵାఉሻሺହఉିସሻ
ଶௗሺଵଶିହሺଷିఉሻఉሻ   ሺ21ሻ 
Note that ߠଵ∗ is positive only if ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ. It implies that if the two products are not much 
differentiated, firm 1 will engage in ECSR and choose ܽ௜ ൐ 0. Subsequently, we also have a 
positive ECSR of late adopter, i.e., firm 2. 
ߠଶ∗ ൌ ሺଶିఉሻ
మሺଵାఉሻሺହఉିସሻ
ଶௗሺଶ଴ିሺଶଵିହఉሻఉሻ   ሺ22ሻ 
Thus, we have ߠଵ∗ ൐ ߠଶ∗ ൐ 0 if ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ. Then, the equilibrium outcomes are: 
ݍଵ∗ ൌ ݍଶ∗ ൌ ஺ሺଵଶିହఉሻ଼ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻ,  ଵܲ∗ ൌ ଶܲ∗ ൌ
஺ሺସିଷఉሻ
଼ሺଶିఉሻ ,  ܽଵ∗ ൌ
஺ሺଵଶି଻ఉሻ
଼ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ ൐ ܽଶ∗ ൌ
஺ሺସିఉሻ
଼ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ , 
                                          
8 It implies that ߠప෡ ൌ 0 at the equilibrium price of abatement goods. 
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ݎ∗ ൌ ஺ሺହఉିସሻ଼  and ߨଶ∗ െ ߨଵ∗ ൌ
஺మሺସିଷఉሻሺହఉିସሻ
ଷଶሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ ൐ 0. 
Then, we have the following proposition.9 
Proposition 1. Both firms adopt ECSR sequentially and purchase abatement goods when 
ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ. But, late adopter chooses a lower degree of ECSR and earns a higher profit than 
early adopter (i.e., late adopter advantage exists).  
We can provide an economic explanation: Due to the fact that price competition leads to 
intense competition, both owners have incentives to lower the degree of competition. Thus, 
the firm i adopts ECSR to penalize its manager with the purpose of inducing higher prices to 
mitigate competition. The increase in a firm i’s ECSR will increase firm j’s ECSR because 
the choices of ECSRs are strategic complements. Then, the increase in firm i’s price will 
increase firm j’s price as well because the choices of prices are also strategic complements. 
Therefore, when the two products are more substitutable, the sequential adoption of ECSR is 
profitable and thus ensures higher profit rather than that without ECSR. Further, early adopter 
induces late adopter to participate in ECSR wave by choosing a higher degree of ECSR. Thus, 
late adopter chooses a lower degree of ECSR, which yields a higher profit than early adopter. 
It indicates that late adopter advantage exists in a sequential adoption of ECSR.10 
Remark 1: We can consider the case where the eco-firm does not exist or/and both polluting 
firms do not purchase abatement goods.11 We then show that both firms adopt ECSR 
sequentially and late adopter advantage still exists. (See Appendix II) 
Remark 2: We can endogenize the timing of choosing the sequence of ECSR, suggested by 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), in which the owner of each firm faces the observable delay 
game. We then show that sequential equilibrium emerges in this game; one firm decides early 
adaptation and the other firm decides late adaptation, in which the former chooses a higher 
degree of ECSR and the latter chooses a lower degree of ECSR. (See Appendix III) 
Remark 3: We can consider the market structure of eco-industry where multiple eco-firms 
                                          
9 Appendix I provides a proof of Proposition 1. 
10 Gal-Or (1985) considers a differentiated Bertrand duopoly with cost symmetry and shows that a second-
mover advantage prevails under general conditions while Amir and Stepanova (2006) show that this holds true 
with asymmetric cost. 
11 From the proof of Proposition 1, it also happens when ߚ ∈ ሺ0,0.8ሻ. 
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compete in producing abatement goods. We then show that both firms will adopt ECSR 
sequentially and purchase abatement goods from the eco-firms to mitigate competition if the 
two products are very much substitutable. We also show that as the number of eco-firms 
increases, total purchases of the abatement goods decrease. (See Appendix IV) 
4. Conclusion 
The adoption of ECSR can be generally thought of strategic substitutes because it increases 
the company’s own cost while its rivals who do not adopt ECSR have a competitive 
advantage. We showed that this trade-off may not be true because the choices of ECSR are 
strategic complements in the strategic managerial incentive design. We showed that the 
sequential adoption of ECSR mitigates price competition and thus, increases their profits if 
the two products are more substitutable. It explains why profit-maximizing firms adopt ECSR 
and may explain why the degree of ECSR is different among firms. 
As a future research, we can consider environmental policies such as subsidies on abatement 
facilities, emission taxes and tradable permits, and investigate the strategic interactions 
between the profitable ECSR and environmental regulations. Further, we can consider a form 
of two-part tariffs with subsidy and unit price on abatement goods. Then, the eco-firm can 
construct optimal two-part tariff scheme to maximize its profits with/without government 
subsidy on abatement goods.12 These challenging issues are left to future research. 
Appendix I: The proof of Proposition 1 
It is sufficient to show that no firm will deviate from the equilibrium outcome with interior 
solutions in choosing the prices and abatement goods at the fourth stage. In particular, we will 
compare ௜ܶ in the corner solutions with zero abatement goods (ܽ௜ ൌ 0). Let the equilibrium 
outcomes with interior solutions be ௜ܶ∗ ൌ ௜ܶ൫ܽ௜∗, ௝ܽ∗, ௜ܲ∗, ௝ܲ∗൯ and the deviation outcomes 
with corner solutions with zero abatement goods be ௜ܶௗ ൌ ௜ܶ൫0, ܽ௝∗, ௜ܲௗ, ௝ܲ∗൯. Then, we can 
show that ௜ܶ∗ ൐ ௜ܶௗ for ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ and ݅ ൌ 1,2. That is, each manager can get higher 
payoffs under the interior solutions with positive abatement (ܽ௜ ൐ 0ሻ than deviation to zero 
abatement (ܽ௜ ൌ 0ሻ at the fourth stage. Therefore, when 	ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ, the outcomes of 
interior solutions are on the equilibrium path as a subgame perfect equilibrium.  
                                          
12 For example, see David and Sinclair-Desgagne (2005) and Lee and Park (2011) in the literature of eco-
industry. 
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Appendix II: The equilibrium without abatement goods 
We will consider the outcomes of corner solutions, ܽ௜ ൌ 0		in (9), when ߚ ∈ ሺ0,0.8ሻ. Then, 
in the third stage, the equilibrium price, which maximizes the objective function of each 
manager in (5) is: 
௜ܲ ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉ
మାଶௗఏ೔ሻሺሺଵିఉሻሺଶାఉሻାଶௗఏೕሻ
ሺସିఉమሻሺଵିఉమሻାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻሺఏ೔ାఏೕሻାସௗమఏ೔ఏೕ		  
In the first stage, the profit of firm 2 is: 
ߨଶ ൌ ଶܲݍଶ ൌ ஺
మሺଵିఉమାଶௗఏమሻሺሺଵିఉሻሺଶାఉሻାଶௗఏభሻమ
ሺሺସିఉమሻሺଵିఉమሻାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻሺఏభାఏమሻାସௗమఏభఏమሻమ  
The first-order condition with respect to the degree of ECSR yields: 
ߠଶሺߠଵሻ ൌ ఉ
మሺଵିఉమሻାଶௗఉమఏభ
ଶௗሺଶିఉమାଶௗఏభሻ   
Then, we have ߠଶሺ0ሻ ൐ 0 and డఏమሺఏభሻడఏభ ൐ 0. This shows that ߠଶ is positive as far as ߠଵ is 
positive, i.e., ߠଶ ൐ 0 when ߠଵ ൐ 0. We also have డ
మఏమሺఏభሻ
డఏభమ ൏ 0. This implies that ߠଵ ൌ ߠଶ ൌ
̅ߠ ൌ ඥሺଵିఉమሻିሺଵିఉమሻଶௗ ൐ 0. Thus, we have the following relations: ߠଵ
ழ
வ ߠଶ when ߠଵ
ழ
வ ̅ߠ.  
In the first stage, the profit of firm 1 is: 
ߨଵ ൌ ஺
మሺଵିఉమାଶௗఏభሻሺସିଶఉିଷఉమାఉయାଶௗሺଶିఉሻఏభሻమ
ଵ଺ሺଶିఉమାଶௗఏభሻమሺଵିఉమାௗఏభሻమ   
Differentiating this profit function with respect to the degree of ECSR yields: 
డగభ
డఏభቚఏభୀ଴ ൌ
஺మௗఉమሺସାଶఉିఉమሻ
ସሺଵାఉሻሺଶିఉమሻయ ൐ 0 and  
డగభ
డఏభቚఏభୀఏమୀߠത ൐ 	0. 
Then, we have ߠଵ∗∗ ൐ ߠଶ∗∗ ൐ 0. Therefore, both firms adopt ECSR sequentially, but late 
adopter advantage exists. 
Appendix III: The endogenous timing game 
We endogenize the timing of the game by adopting the observable delay game, a variant of 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In this game, firm ݅ (݅ ൌ 1,2) simultaneously chooses whether 
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to move early (ݐ௜ = 1) or late (ݐ௜	= 2). The ECSR decision stage is played simultaneously if 
both firms decide the same time, sequentially or otherwise.  
First, suppose that ߠ௜ ൐ 0 at the equilibrium in simultaneous choice game. Then, from the 
profit function of firm ݅ in (6), both firms have the symmetric reaction functions in (19), 
which yields the following results of ECSR:  
ߠ௜ௌ ൌ െ ሺଶିఉሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵାఉሻௗሺଷିଶఉሻ ൏ 0		for			ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ.  
This is a contradiction. It implies that no firm engages in ECSR activities in a simultaneous 
choice game. That is, ߠ௜ௌ ൌ 0 and ܽ௜ௌ ൌ 0, which yields: 
௜ܲ ௌ ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉሻଶିఉ , ݍ௜ௌ ൌ 	
஺
ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻ  and ߨ௜ௌ ൌ 	
஺మሺଵିఉሻ
ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ.  
Finally, we have the profit rankings, which support the sequential choice game as a subgame 
perfect equilibrium:  
ߨ௜∗ െ ߨ௜ௌ ൌ ஺
మሺସିହఉሻమ
ଷଶሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ ൐ 0 and ߨ௝∗ െ ߨ௝ௌ ൌ
஺మఉሺହఉିସሻ
ଵ଺ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ ൐ 0 ⟺ ߚ ∈ ሺ0.8,1ሻ 
Appendix IV: The market structure of eco-industry 
Suppose that ݉ሺ൒ 1ሻ  eco-firms compete in producing abatement goods with Cournot 
fashion and two polluting firms purchase the abatement goods under ECSR. Following the 
analysis of Canton et al. (2008), we assume that the market price of eco-industry is 
determined by total demand of the two polluting firms and total supply of the productions of 
m eco-firms. That is, we have ܽ௎ ൌ 	ܽா at equilibrium where ܽா ൌ ∑ ܽ௘௠௘ୀଵ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜ଶ௜ୀଵ .  
Then, assuming interior solutions of abatement goods, from (11), we have the inverse 
demand function of the abatement goods: 
ݎ ൌ ସ஺ௗఏభఏమሺଶାఉିఉమሻሺఏభାఏమሻାସௗఏభఏమ െ
ଶௗఏభఏమሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻ
ሺଶାఉିఉమሻሺఏభାఏమሻାସௗఏభఏమ ܽ௎  
Using the first order condition of each eco-firm with respect to its abatement goods, డగ೐డ௔೐ ൌ 0, 
and the symmetric equilibrium in the eco-industry, ܽ௎ ൌ ∑ ܽ௘௠௘ୀଵ ൌ ݉ܽ௘, we have: 
ܽ௘ ൌ ଶ஺ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶାఉିఉమሻ, ݎ ൌ
ସ஺ௗఏభఏమ
ሺଵା௠ሻሺሺଶାఉିఉమሻሺఏభାఏమሻାସௗఏభఏమሻ and  
11 
 
ܽ௜ ൌ ஺ሺሺ௠ିଵሻሺଶାఉିఉ
మሻఏೕାఏ೔ሺሺଵା௠ሻሺଶାఉିఉమሻାସௗ௠ఏೕሻሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶାఉିఉమሻሺሺଶାఉିఉమሻሺఏ೔ାఏೕሻାସௗఏ೔ఏೕሻ .  
Note that as ݉ increases, ܽ௘ decreases. 
Finally, from the profit of polluting firm 2, we have the reaction function of firm 2: 
ߠଶ ൌ ሺଵି௠ሺଵିఉሻሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻఏభሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺଷା௠ሺଵିఉሻିଶఉሻାସௗሺଶା௠ሺଵିఉሻିఉሻఏభ  
When ߚ ൐ ௠ିଵ௠ , ߠଶ is positive as far as ߠଵ ൐ 0.  
Then, from the first order conditions for maximizing the profits, we have  
ߠଵ∗ ൌ ሺଶିఉሻ
మሺଵାఉሻሺఉሺଶାଷ௠ሻିሺଵାଷ௠ሻሻ
ଶௗሺ଻ି଻ఉାଶఉమା௠ሺହି଼ఉାଷఉమሻሻ   and ߠଶ∗ ൌ
ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻሺఉሺଶାଷ௠ሻିሺଵାଷ௠ሻሻ
ଶௗሺଵଷିଵଵఉାଶఉమା௠ሺ଻ିଵ଴ఉାଷఉమሻሻ. 
Note that the degree of ECSR is positive when ߚ ൐ ߚ ൌ ଵାଷ௠ଶାଷ௠, where ߚ	is increasing in ݉ 
and ߚ ൌ 0.8 if ݉ ൌ1. Thus, as m approaches infinity, no firms purchase abatement goods in 
the eco-industry even though both polluting firms adopt ECSR. Also, we can show that the 
outcomes of interior solutions are on the equilibrium path as a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
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